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Personal Reminiscences of the War of the Rebellion.

FIELD OF ANTIETAM.

Good Plain Hard Fighting, but Questionable Tactics.

THE PLAN OF ATTACK.

Hooker's Assault--- Mansfield's

Timely Arrival.

By Major-General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. [COLVEIGHTED.-ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.]

XX.

Our two columns, passing through Crampton's Pass and Turner's Gap, debouched into the walley, the one at Rohrersville and the other at Boonsboro'. The portion below, embracing Franklin's and McLaw's operations, is called Pleasant Valley, while that above is named little east of Sharpsburg, enters the Potomac a though full of short crooks, is almost due south.

to General Lee just the obstacle he needed for his advance at the first glimmer of daylight. delaying our approach. He located Hill and proaches. There were in this rough country roads, abundant fences, stone walls, buildings, and considerable well-located strips of wood.

Dunker Chapel is near the hardest-contested portion of the battle-ground. It is about equidistant from the Newkirk bridge, the Potomac, and Sharpsburg. Going up the Hagerstown pike you find it a little more than one mile from town on the Potomac side. It is almost enveloped by a forest reaching the road to the north of it, which forest then again recedes, leaving open ground along the pike, but continues toward the Potomac for at least half a first line- the first one which he formed.

To return to our columns. Franklin was The other column-the one to which I be- space that lay between him and the west victories. Why could not the Army of the Polonged-pushed on rapidly, but much extended. from the South Mountain and Boonsbore', on

tion, with the Antictam in his front, was evidently too much of an obstacle to be overcome about 9 a. m. without considerable more force than could be

brought up that evening.

UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. Eager as McClellan was to engage him before the return of Jackson and the other Harper's Ferry detachments, he was forced to postpone his attempt at least till the next morning. Taking into the account all the sickness, discouragement, disgust, envice and contentions which followed in the wake of the second Bull Run and the Harper's Ferry disaster, it will not seem strange that much of our army was strung along the thoroughfares between Washington and South Mountain. Even the reaction from our small successes at the South biofinition Passes produced additional wearipess, willfulness, -lawness, and indifference on the part of some officers-and some of them.

too, helding responsible commands. These suggestions will account for strange delays in the marches which were ordered and the comparatively small number which we actually had in position in front of Lee as late

as the morning of the 16th of September. If our general had had clear knowledge of the position, and such maps as we now have before us when we examine this field, he would have been able to have opened the battle cor-

tainly by 8 or 9 o'clock of this day. True, Jackson himself had arrived from Har-

per's Ferry, but he brought but two divisionsthose of Jones and Lawton-and had probably not to exceed five thousand infantry. McLaws did not come till the next morning, Anderson's division still later, and A. P. Hill, left to settle matters at Harper's Ferry, did not reach the field until about 2 p. m. of the next day.

Certainly, from want of previous detailed

knowledge; from the natural desire to have more force-say Franklin and Couch-and influenced doubtless by the habit of his mind to overestimate the numbers of his adversary, McClellan spent all the morning in probing for information and in settling upon his plan of attack. It was at last fixed, in substance, to assault both the right and the left in force, and should both of the flank movements prove effective, then to push for the center with whatever reserves he had at hand. Hooker's corps, followed by Mansfield's and then Sumner's, were destined for the right column. Burnside's corps, consisting of four divisions and plenty of artillery to help him, was given the work of storming the lower bridge that now bears his name, and then, striking the enemy's right flank, of making there a vigorous attack. Porter's corps and Franklin's wing, or such of it as could get to us in time, were to be held in hand for the direct central thrust, whenever that should become practicable.

HOOKER'S ATTACK.

The movement for executing this plan commenced in plain sight of the enemy, but from the small river-the Antietam-which, did not succeed in deceiving him, as did passing near Hagerstown, Funkstown, and a Grant's preliminary Orchard Knob reconnaissance at Chattanooga. About 4 p. m. Hooker's few miles below. The course of this stream, corps, having been previously sent up the left bank of the Antietam, crossed that river by The battlefield of Antietam is just west of the | fords and a bridge not far from Keedeysville river and in the neighborhood of Sharpsburg. | which our cavalry had secured and been keep-After the defeat at Turner's Gap, the next | ing for him. The general led his command, day (the 15th) Lee gathered all the material evidently with a hope of turning Lee's left, and the troops that he had in hand on the far away past Dunbar Mills toward a crosspeninsula formed here by the Anticiam and road on the Hagerstown pike. Doubleday's the Potomac,-for the bends of the Potomac division led the column. He had proceeded above Sharp-burg cause the intervening space | perhaps a couple of miles in an oblique directo be nearly inclosed, the neck at the nar- tion northwesterly, when the enemy's skirrowest point not exceeding two miles and a brishers opened fire. Hooker at once formed half across. A main road crossing the Poto- his line to the left. The Pennsylvania reserves, mac at Shepherdstown, where there is a good | under Mcade, were in the center, Doubleday to ford, continuing north through the village of the right, and Ricketts' division to the left Sharpsburg, intersects the Anticiam by a stone | Hood's division was deployed mainly in the bridge and, still running northeasterly, goes | "east woods" before described, connecting with through the small town of Keedeysville and D. H. Hill's left, while Jackson's two divisionson to Boonsboro'. This is usually called the those of Lawton and J. R. Jones-were probably Sharp-burg pike. Another road coming up by this time in the west woods, near Dunker from Harper's Ferry, crossing the Antietam | Church, with their advance considerably ahead near its mouth, passes through Sharpsburg and in a detached grove which is close by the Wilcontinues in a northerly direction. It is called | liamsburg fork of the Hagerstown pike; Stuthe Haperstown pike. One other important art, with cavalry and horse artillery, on the roadway from Sharpsburg divides the eastern | heights, being further west, nearer the Potoangle between the turnpikes into equal parts, | mac. Hooker, without hesitation, pressed in crosses the Antietam at what is now known as upon the enemy. A severe musketry fire en-Burnside's bridge, and proceeds for several sued, and a sharp contest was continued, with large as his own. General Johnston advanced erate fortifications at Yorktown, erected where miles in a southeasterly direction till it reaches some apparent success on our side, till near 10 higher ground and then forks; one fork leads to o'clock at night, when Jackson, finding Hood's Arlington Heights. People who climbed to the tionary war, and march up the Peninsula. the right, or north of Snake Creek, the way Rohrersville and Pleasant Valley. A few miles command exhausted and hungry from a long cupola of the Capitol could see the Confederate The vessels with supplies could then go up above the Sharpsharg crossing, a zigzag cross- fast, replaced his division, and organized his flags waving in the breeze. It was so audacious York River to West Point, and the army, while the Crump's Landing road, where two roads led road, which I designate "diagonal road," pass- own with such other help from batteries and that General McClellan was sure that Johnston besieging Richmond, could receive its supplies to the battlefield. The fact that Snake Creek ing from the Sharpsburg to the Hagerstown from D. H. Hill on his right and Stuart on his had a great army. pike, intersects the Antictam near Newkirk. left, as he could gather in the night. Hooker As the Antietam, from Newkirk to its mouth, also rectified his lines, and had his batteries had abrupt banks and but few fords, it became arranged as well as he could to protect or assist

Mansfield's supporting corps crossed the An-Longstreet on the right and left of the Sharps- | tietam, but encamped through the night more burg pike, while he sent off Hood's single than a mile in the rear of Hooker, while the division to the extreme left of his proposed other supporting comes (Sumner's) was bivline, to what I have called the neck of the pen- ouacking away off to McClellan's left, near the insula. On Lee's arrival he did not have to Boonsboro' and Sharpsburg turnpike, under exceed 25,000 men all told, but, with considera- the enemy's artillery fire. I remember this ble artillery, his batteries were so arranged | fact, for as General Sedgwick and I were standas to defend the bridges and cover the ap- ing the evening of the 16th of September and examining Lee's apparent position beyond the rocky heights, favorable ravines, deep-cut | river, an officer in charge of McClellan's headquarters baggage-train led his long column to a pleasant spot on the slope just behind us. The borhood. This officer quickly countermarched his train, and hurried it off far to the rear under the eyes of the laughing men of our command. Sedgwick seeing this headquarters move, shook his head solemnly, and said: "I am sorry to see that!" Some officers never seem to think how easily in times and places of danger the morale of an army is affected.

SUMNER'S ORDERS. Summer was ordered on the 16th to be ready mile. We call this forest the Dunker woods or to march one hour before daylight. We were "west woods." No prize of chivalry was ever all ready, but McClellan's order of execution more desperately contested for than this seem- did not reach us till 7:20 a.m., and then it ingly unimportant strip of woodland. East of embraced but two divisions, Richardson's being army not to do any damage to the property of the Hagerstown pike and somewhat further detained-probably to wait for Franklin's ar- the Confederates. Slaves were not to be monorth, near Dunbar Mills, was a large, open rival. Immediately our division-that is, Sedg- lested. When the Huchinson family-three grove, clear of underbrush, called in reports the wick's-moved off in good order to the upper | brothers and a sister-visited the camps and "east woods." This point was the left of Lee's | crossings of the Antietam at the rate of about three miles an hour

Once over the Antictam, by Sumner's order, ery in sentiment. held in check by McLaws, after the latter had our three brigades moved in parallel columns, performed his part in the capture of Har- perhaps seventy-five yards apart, Dana's in the per's Ferry. He curtained Franklin's front | center, Gorman's on the left, and mine on the with skirmishers, but avoided battle. When right. We pulled on rapidly in this order till finally McClellan ordered Franklin to rejoin | we came in sight of the Dunbar Mills and our the main army at the Antietam, McLaws columns extended through the east woods. night the correspondents sent the dispatchcrossed the Potomac twice, and succeeded in Here we faced to the left, making three brigade "All quiet along the Potomac." reaching Lee's command at Sharpsburg the lines parallel to each other, Dana's being in same hour that Franklin joined McClellan. front-fronting the famous corn-field and open asked. In the West the armies were winning

While Sedgwick's artillery chief is putting through Keedeysville to the banks of the his batteries in position and detachments in Dang's front are breaking down the high fences During the 15th, but two divisions-Richard- which may obstruct his advance, let us see if son's and Sykes'-were sufficiently near to we can give a summary of the doings, first, of receive the enemy's fire. Lee's army in posi- Hooker, then of Mansfield, which have consumed the time from dawn to our coming,

THE MORNING ADVANCE

Promptly at daylight the battle began by six batteries under Hooker's control, and then an attempt to advance by each division. Doubleday's, which was astride of the Hagerstown pike, having Gibbon's brigade, followed. by Patrick's, on the right and Hoffman's on the left, pushed on in the grove near the crossroads. Immediately these met a heavy fire from front and right from artillery and infantry, and did as troops usually do-returned

fire for fire with all possible rapidity. Meade, who had apparently the heaviest force before him the night before, succeeded in making more progress than Doubleday, firing and advancing slowly.

Ricketts' division, supporting the batteries to the left of it, and materially aided by their searching fire, made more ground still, but there supears to have been surging to and fro. The forces engaged were about equal, and the losses of men killed and wounded were astonishing. Ricketts' division alone had lost over a thousand men, while the small brigade of Gibbon counted nearly four hundred. The losses on the enemy's side were equally heavy.

A very accurate writer, General F. W. Palfrey, thus estimates these Confederate losses

General Starke, commanding the Stonewall [Continued on 8th page.]

The Story of the War Retold for Our Boys and Girls.

TO RICHMOND.

The Army of the Potomac in the Winter of '62.

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

Siege of Yorktown and Battle of

Williamsburg.

By "Carleton."

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XVII. To the Boys and Girls of the United States: It was a very small-affair-the battle of Rich Mountain - which made General McClellan commander of the armies of the United States. His headquarters were at Washington. President Lincoln, the army, and the people had great confidence in him.

sent across the Potomac or out to the hills | Secretary of War. around Washington, where they were drilled. In September and October, 1861, there were grand reviews, attended by the President and Cabinet, members of Congress, and great listen to the music of the bands. In October | to find out all that was going on. thousand men and three hundred pieces of artillery. The soldiers had great confidence in

"The army is gathering from near and from far, The trumpet is sounding the call for the war, McClellan's our leader—he's gallant and strong, We'll gird on our armor and be marching along."

So ran one of the songs which the soldiers seemed to be never weary of singing. To protect Washington strong forts were

constructed and great guns mounted.

ON THE PICKET-LINE.

On a day in October I rode out with General Richardson, who commanded a division of General McClellan's army. We dismounted from our horses, walked through a corn-field and came to the picket-lines. We were so near the Confederates that we could hear them talking, and could see the soldiers behind the breastworks.

"As near as I can make out, there are about seven thousand, and they have no supports nearer than Fairfax Court-House. In an hour's time we could pounce upon them with seventy thousand men," said General Richardson, and added: "I am ordered, if attacked, to fall back to the forts. I don't understand it."

General Johnston erected batteries along the Potomac, blockading it so that vessels could enemy sent a few bursting shells into his neigh- not reach Washington, compelling the Union army and the city to receive all supplies by the one line of railroad leading to Baltimore. PUBLIC OPINION.

The people began to lose confidence General McClellan. Everything he had asked for President Lincoln had granted, but he had given nothing in return. There was a political party in the country which had opposed the war,-it called itself the "Peace party,"-which applauded his inaction, but which led some people who were earnest for the prosecution of the war to think that his heart was not in it. He ordered the sang songs to cheer the soldiers, he ordered them to leave, because one song was anti-slav-

Autumn passed and winter came. The roads were muddy, and General McClellan decided that it was too late to march to Centreville and attack the Confederates. In February he had more than two hundred thousand men. Every

"Why does not the army move?" the people tomac?

ON TO RICHMOND.

When the army under General McDowell marched to Bull Run it was a movement towards Richmond-towards the Confederate capital. The idea was uppermost in the mind of the people and of General McClellan that he must capture Richmond. It was the capital of the Confederacy. The Confederate Congress was in session there. Jefferson Davis was there. It was thought that its capture would put an end to the rebellion. The people had cried "On to Richmond," but the people did not see, neither did General McClellan, that Richmond was of little account. The strength of the Confederacy was in the armies under Johnston, Lee, and Beauregard. They must be defeated before the rebellion could be crushed. In the Revolutionary war the British obtained possession of Philadelphia, but the Continental Congress moved to York, and the war went on. When General Howe got tired of holding it he undertook to march to New York, and was pounc-

ed upon by General Washington at Monmonth. President Lincoln saw what General Mc-Ciellan and the people did not see-that the Confederate army must be defeated first of all. Johnston was at Centreville. Why not attack

him there, within a day's march of supplies? President Lincoln became so dissatisfied with General McClellan's inaction, that on Washington's Birthday-February 22-he issued an order for all the armies to move. The Western armies did move, and we see what they accomplished at Donelson, Island No. 10, and Pittsburg Landing. At the time the order was issued General McClellan had no plan as to what he would do. He was not willing to march to Centreville, which was strongly forti-

fied, but wanted to go down the Potomac to MIII Fortress Monroe, and march to Richmond. "McClellan never intended to march to Cen-

treville," says Prince de Joinville, of France, who was on McClellan's staff, and who has written a history of the war. "For weeks and Movements of perhaps months this plan [of going to the Peninsula] had been secretly maturing."

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S FEARS. The President was afraid that while McClellan was on his way to Richmond General

Johnston would be on his way to Washingtonfor Jefferson Davis would have liked nothing better than to swap off Richmond for Washingtalked the matter over, and that one of their plans was to cross the Potomac below Washington, and another to cross above Washington and get between Washington and Baltimore and cut the railroad.

COUNCIL OF WAR. President Lincoln said that General Mc-Clellan and his corps commanders must decide upon a plan, but that enough troops must be left to protect Washington. There were four corps commanders-Sumner, McDowell, Heintzelman and Keves.

"A force of 40,000 should be left to protect Washington," said General Sumner. "With the forts fully garrisoned, 25,000 men

McDowell. move the remainder of the force down the the landing. A short distance back from the Potomac, choose a new base at Fortress Monroe shore the ground rises abruptly to a height of Ohio. The cavalry pickets which, but for He reorganized the army. As new regiments or anywhere, but move in pursuit of the enemy one hundred feet. The soil was soaked and their numerical inferiority to those of the ene-

The day after the council of war General Johnston and Jeff Davis knew all about it through spies, for there were a great many crowds of people, who came from all parts of men and women in Washington who sympathe country to see the regiments march and to | thized with the Confederates, and who planned

> General Johnston saw that he must be in position to defend Richmond. It was of no use to stay at Centreville. He sent off his supplies. abandoned the batteries along the Potomac, evacuated Centreville, crossed the Rappahannock River, and waited to see what McClellan was going to do.

GETTING READY. The army was to go by water, 180 miles, to and you will see the James River coming down directions, and cut up by ravines, through their lives by running away as fast as their from Richmond. North of it is the York River, which small streams were flowing. The line legs will carry them. The Confederate army which had won the a short arm of Chesapeake Bay, with a railroad battle of Bull Run, under General Joseph E. leading from West Point to Richmond. The lay between Owl Creek and an estuary of Lick Johnston, was at Centreville and Manassas. It country between the two streams is the "Pe- Creek, now flooded with back water from the numbered only 55,000 men, though General Me- ninsula." General McClellan determined to Clellan believed that Johnston had an army as land at Fortress Monroe, capture the Confedone division to Munson's Hill, just out from the English fortifications stood in the Revoluby the York River Railroad. General McDow-

> and then join him. Do you ask why General McClellan did not go up James River? Because the Virginia, Shiloh Church. On the 4th, General Wallace, Monroe, was at Norfolk, with only the Monitor

Never before was there such activity in hirng vessels-113 steamboats, 189 schooners, 88 barges, which were obtained in Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York and Boston, costing millions of dollars. In thirty-seven days 122,-000 men, 15,000 horses, 1,150 wagons, 264 pieces of field artillery, besides ambulances, thousands of tents, a mountain of supplies, were transported from Washington to Fortress Monroe.

YORKTOWN. Going now to Yorktown, -which, you know, the bridges over Owl and Snake Creeks, as the s on the south bank of York River, -and walk- loss of the latter bridge would prevent the ing south, you see Wormsley Creek, emptying passage of re-enforcements in either direction. into York River, and another stream, Warwick River, running south and emptying into James River. General Magruder, who commands at Yorktown, has built several dams on the streams to make them wide and deep, and along the western bank has thrown up intrenchments and placed heavy guns in position. He had only 11,000 men-one-half of them in the forts at Yorktown and the other half guarding the trenches and keeping watch along a line thirteen miles in length. He is ready to retreat at any moment, and is greatly astonished when he discovers that General McClellan, instead of making an attack, begins to throw up intrenchments for a siege.

"To my utter surprise," wrote General Magruder, "he permitted day after day to slapse without an assault."

examined the works, said that they were very strong, and sent to Washington for heavy guns, soldiers laid aside their guns and began to ing roads, guarding the crossing at Lick Creek; them had never been in battle. throw up piles of earth and make gabions Hurlbut was massed and in reserve to the left The forces, Union and Confederate, were are not very rare later in the season in the month of April they worked. General McClellan was sure that the Confederate army in front of him was as large as his own. He had left less than 20,000 men to protect Washington, and when the President detached General McDowell, who was at Fredericksburg, from his command, General McClellan claimed that it greatly hindered him in his operations.

THE VERMONTERS. One day a regiment of the Vermont brigade, under Colonel Hyde, plunged into the Warwick River, and, though the water was nearly up to their arms, waded across, rushed up the bank, charged upon a North Carolina regiment, and drove the Confederates into the trenches; but no troops were sent across to support them and they had to fall back, losing more than 150 men. If the whole brigade had been sent over they could have held the ground and saved General McClellan three weeks' time; but he had only one plan-to place his heavy guns in position and fire shot and shell till he could silence Magruder's guns.

THE EVACUATION. his way into the Union lines. Genera! Mc- past six weeks. Clellan did not believe it. On the morning of the 4th he would open fire from all his guns and mortars.

"Keep up a heavy fire through the night but spike the cannon at daybreak and retreat to Williamsburg," was General Magruder's order, and all through the night the Confederate cannon thundered, throwing shot and shell at the Union earthworks Daybreak came and suddenly the firing

[Continued on 8th page.]

THE BATTLE GROUND.

ton. We now know that Davis and Johnston | Precarious Position of Grant's Army.

> JOHNSTON'S ADVANCE.

Organization of the Confederate Army.

III.

Pittsburg Landing, a hamlet of a few houses, enforced by General Buell's, should be strong will be enough," said Keyes, Heintzelman and | was the port of Corinth, Miss., twenty-four enough, as Sherman said, "to repeat the tacmiles distant. The Tennessee River, turning ties of Fort Donelson," he adopted no measures "Leave Washington entirely secure, and from its westward course, flows due north past to render the position of his own army secure and batteries reached Washington they were by some route," was the order of Mr. Stanton, the creeks flooded by recent rains when the army of General Grant took position there in Corinth, were hardly out of sight of the inthe latter part of March. The mud, kneaded fantry. His troops, exposed to attack at any by the constant tramp of men and animals, between the bluff and the river's edge was | wide intervals on the roads by which they had deep and black.

The road to Corinth ascended the hill in plenty of trees in their front, but none were rear of the landing and pursued a southwest cut for an abatis, and not a spadeful of earth course across the battlefield, crossing the Ham- was thrown up as a defense. Of all these burg and Purdy road, near Shiloh Church, two and a half miles from the landing.

Sherman said of the battlefield: "You might search the world over and not find a more advantageous field of battle-flanks well a position without works is to "test their manprotected and never threatened, troops in easy | hood," the experiment is barbarous, and it is support, and timber and broken ground giving sincerely to be hoped that when in future wars good points to rally."

thickly wooded, interspersed with small clear- are as abundant as they were at Shiloh. Fortress Monroe. Open your map of Virginia ings, crossed by various roads leading in various they will resent the cheap value placed upon open to attack from the direction of Corinth river, a space varying in extent from one to three miles, depending upon the advance of the line of defense. If, however, the enemy should choose to make a flank movement upon was open by moving via Purdy, thence down would present a natural line of defense for the ell, with 40,000 men, was to move from Wash- Union forces would probably prevent a moveington to Fredericksburg, covering Washing- ment in that direction, but to guard against it ton till the army was in front of Richmond, General Lewis Wallats's division was stationed on that road in what was supposed to be easy supporting distance of the main force near to prevent her from coming out and destroying ing from Purdy to its position in line of battle on the left of Polk's corps, notified General Grant that there was a heavy force in his front, whereupon Grant directed W. H. L. Wallace to hold himself in readiness to move his entire command to the support of Lewis Wallace. General Grant inand directed him to be ready to give the support of his division and that of General Hurlbut if necessary. In the event of attack upon either side, it was of vital importance to guard

ALIGNMENT OF THE TROOPS. three brigades of his division posted on the Buell's. To fight Grant first, Buell afterwards, right, in advance of the rest of the army, near | had been the object of the concentration of his Shiloh Church. His division lay directly armies. It had been his object to preserve the Creek, on the Purdy road, and resting on Owl good condition to take the offensive at once if rear and near the landing was the divis- given personal attention to every detail conion of W. H. L. Wallace, posted in such | nected with the comfort of his men. He made a position as to move readily to Sher- no forced marches; he saw that they were reguman's support or to re-enforce Lewis Wal- larly supplied with provisions; that the sick of Pilot Knob and Charlie had prepared a lace by the lower or river road, as cir- were cared for, and that officers did their duty cumstances might demand. On Sherman's -a lesson that those ever-ready antagonists to left and rear, but somewhat retired, was Mc- the Army of the Cumberland in after years, baskets and bottles, after which the doctor ex-Clernand's division, his right overlapping Breckenridge, Cheatham and Cleburne, un- hibited his fine specimens of loadstone from General McClellan landed on the 2d of April, Sherman; Prentiss was on a line with Sher- doubtedly profited by. The force at hand with Shepherd's Mountain, eigars were lighted, and man, facing southwest, and on the extreme left | which to strike the blow at the Union army | the whole company joined in admiration of was Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division, at consisted of raw and veteran troops in about the magnificent sunset scene. It was early in spades and shovels. Instead of attacking, the the junction of the Purdy and Crump's Land- equal proportions; that is, about one-half of August—too early for those gorgeous sunsets (great baskets), which were filled with earth to of W. H. L. Wallace, covering the interval be- about equal, and the description furnished by Central States; but over the western hills ween Prentiss and Stuart. This irregular line, extending from the crossing of the Hamburg road near the mouth of Lick Creek around to the bridge over Snake Creek, was so posted as to cover all the important roads approaching the landing from any direction. Badeau, in despair of accounting for the oversight in not erecting breastworks, says: "There were no intrenchments, for the Western troops had not vet learned the lesson of defense which they afterwards applied so well." As the "troops" would have had no right to dig intrenchments unless ordered to do so, it is evident that for "troops" the celebrated eulogist should have ston determined to time his attack by Buell's written "generals." Napoleon had many years before found by experience, and handed down the principle, that "Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect each other;" and, again, that "it should be laid | depended must be fought without it. down as a principle never to leave intervals by which the enemy can penetrate between corps. But Secretary Stanton had declared that "the true organization of victory" was in Grant's message to Buckner, "I propose to move immediately on your works," and this had ers to set their troops in motion for an advance "The Confeds are getting ready to leave," been the theme of all the newspaper plaudits said a negro the on the night of May 1st made sung in the praise of General Grant for the MISPLACED CONFIDENCE.

The objective point of the campaign was

Corinth, the point of crossing of the Memphis and Charleston and Mobile and Ohio Railroads, a place of vast strategic importance to the Confederates in the transportation of troops and supplies across the Confederacy. It was a point worth fighting for, and well worthy of a vigorous campaign to effect its capture. Common prudence, therefore, would seem to have dictatated that unusual precautions should have

been taken by the commander of that portion of the army already almost in its front to prevent any disaster to his forces while awaiting re-enforcements. General Grant visited the encampment daily, but retained his headquarters at Savannah, as if confident that no movement would be made against him. The position of Gen. Lewis Wallace at Crump's Landing and Adamsville was equally perilous, yet no measures were taken to render it secure against attack. He was expected to hold it without breastworks, with 5,000 men, against Johnston's army, until re-enforcements could reach him from Pittsburg Landing, or, failing in this, to retreat through the swamps along a narrow corduroyed road to the main army. The kind Providence that has watched over the United States from the infancy of the GENEVIEVE'S DISCOVERY. Republic alone interfered to save this division from destruction, by diverting the attack in another direction.

General Grant had forgotten that only the incapacity or irresolution of Floyd and Pillow had saved his army from defeat and destruc-Wallace before Donelson, and he had no idea of the mighty purpose of his antagonist to hazard all in the attempt to win a victory and save Corinth. Having formed the determination to advance upon Corinth when his army, rewhile awaiting the arrival of the Army of the my, should have been advanced half way to moment, were encamped at will, separated by marched out from the landing. There were many of the regiments had only received their guns at Paducah a few days before. If to require troops, whether raw or veteran, to defend men are called upon to make breastworks of The ground back of the bluff was broken and their bodies when time, and trees, and earth

THE VALUE OF EARTHWORKS. An attacking force must necessarily expose itself, and there are many cases in which the assault must be met in the open field, but unnecessary exposure to the missiles of the enemy is forbidden alike by motives of humanity and policy, for it is a waste of lives and of bayonets. It is a consolation, however, to reflect that, like those youthful surgeons whose knowledge of the art was derived from books, and who finally became perfect through the suffering of others, the lesson had to be learned by our generals, and it was as well that it should be given by the grim instructors at Shiloh as elsewhere. The value of earthworks was taught to the Army of the Tennessee at Shiloh. It was the dying gift of Sidney Johnston, but it remained Mountain. which had destroyed the war ships off Fortress | deceived by the movements of Cheatham's di- Army of the Ohio when, eight months laterfor Bragg to impart the information to the vision of Johnston's army, when advanc- the veteran legions of McCook fled panic stricken from the field of Stone River. GRANT FIRST, BUELL AFTERWARDS. Meanwhile General Johnston had arrived at

Corinth. Encouraged by President Davis, who had throughout all his reverses remained his steadfast friend, and by General Robert E. Lee, from whom a sympathizing and encouraging formed Sherman that he had given this order letter awaited him, he set about organizing an army from the forces gathered there under Beauregard, Polk and Bragg, and those brought with him from Murfreesboro'. He had effected the junction of his own command with that of Beauregard on the 25th of March. In daily anticipation of being cut off by an expedition up the Tennessee, his fears had proved to be groundless, and now he felt confident of being am?" The position of the several divisions on the able to move upon Grant's army at Pittsburg night of the 5th was as follows: Sherman had Landing before it should be re-enforced by across the main Corinth road, but his right | morale of his army,-always a difficult task on | dat." was refused, covering the bridge over Owl a retreat,-so as to place it at Corinth in Creek, with a swamp in his front. In his necessary, and to accomplish this object he had

Bragg of the Confederate army would apply with equal force to both. "It was an heterogeneous mass, in which there was more enthusiasm than discipline, more capacity than knowledge, and more valor than instruction," The sick were left behind, and during three days of heavy marching the weak ones in the Confederate column went to the wall, while this class occupied their positions in the Union camps and answered to their names at roll-call. General Beauregard was second in command. It was known that Buell was advancing, and so was Van Dorn, from Arkansas, and General Johnmovements. If Van Dorn's command could reach him before it should be necessary to move upon Grant, victory was assured; but if not, the battle upon which such momentous issues THE MARCH FROM CORINTH.

At 11 o'clock on the night of April 2d information reached General Johnston that Buell's to be. advance had left Columbia, and two hours later orders were issued to the corps commandupon Pittsburg Landing. He was not unacquainted with the natural strength of Grant's position and he had no reason to suppose that advantage had not been taken of natural decenses to strengthen them by abatis and earthworks. But the importance of immediate attack outweighed every consideration that could arise even from positive information that the force he was about to attack was protected by such defenses. The orders required that each soldier should be supplied with five days' rations and one hundred rounds of ammunition-In the afternoon of the 3d of April the move-

[Continued on 8th page.]

Founded on Incidents Connected With the War for the Union.

THE GRAY AND THE BLUE

The Doctor's Excursion to Old Fort Hovey.

On the Hotel Veranda --- An Interesting Colloquy.

tion on the day previous to the arrival of Lewis By Lt.-Col. E. R. Roe, Author of "Brought to Bay," &c. [COPYRIGHTED, 1884, SY E. T. ROE.] CHAPTER X.

AROUND OLD FORT HOVEY.

The whole party went to the region of the old fort, delighted with the view in every direction, while Captain Adams, at the request of Genevieve, described the fort as he saw it in 1862, while Hovey's men were building it,the 33d Illinois. General Grant's old regiment -the 21st Illinois-was then stationed at Irogton, close by, and the 38th Illinois, under Colonel Carlin, was at the Knob. It required two or three months' work of a thousand men, and when completed was little better than a stockade. It was built of heavy timber cut on the ground close by, and was about one hundred yards by sixty in extent: a vast parallelogram twelve feet high, made of logs in tiers ten feet anart. and filled in with dirt between. And at the corners were bustions mounted each with a

twenty-pounder cannon. "But it was not a piece of your engineering,

Captain?" inquired the major. "No. I should hardly have built an open fort on that spot, with Pilot Knob on one side. Shepherd's Mountain on another, and com-

manding eminences on three sides." "And what became of it?" inquired Miss Annie. "Was it never of any use? I thought

our engineers knew better." "The fact was," replied the captain, "we had not engineers enough to go round: there were too many points to be defended. But it did frighten away Jeff Thompson at one time. He came within six miles with his army one night, and then concluded to back out for want

of heavy guns." "And what became of the fort?" "It was abandoned as untenable before Price's raid in 1864, and the forces concentrated at the Knob; and during the battle at Pilot Knob, in September of that year, Price's troops destroy-

ed the fort."

vieve sought a favorable position for sketching Pilot Knob, while Jane strolled about with the field-glass in hand, and the gentlemen went over to have a close inspection of Shepherd's

Returning to the vicinity of the tent, Gene-

Charlie stood looking with much cariosity as Genevieve's sketching, when she observed him "Were you a slave before the war, Charlie?" He was a tall, likely-looking colored man,

quite intelligent and very polite. He replied:

"Yes, Miss. I belonged to Mars' Canidwell "You! Good gracious, Charlie, you were not my brother's boy who was burned to death in

the jail-or was supposed to be?" "Yes, Miss," replied Charlie with a grin: "but I wasn't burnt to death. You see, the Union folks heered me a yellin' and a yellin', and dey chopt de do' lock off wid an axe an

"Why Charlie!" exclaimed Genevieve in great surprise. "And do you know who I

"I 'spect I does, Miss. You's Mars' Cauldwell's sister. Seed you often, Miss, when you was a little one." "And how did you know that, Charlie?" "De doctah's coachman, Tom, tole me bout

"Well, I'm sure I don't know how Tonknew; but the servants know all about the

folks, I suppose.1 "Jes' so, Miss," replied Charlie. The sun was going down over the hills in the west before Genevieve completed her sketch lunch in front of the tent. The gentlemen soon came up, and all did justice to Charlie's was now outstretched a cloud-banner it was a wonder to behold! The whole horizon above the hill-tops was a background of glowing ether like molten gold. Stretched before it were streakings of purple shaded with gray, with amethystine edges, and between these stripings of fiery red almost too brilliant for the eye, while behind a distant hill-top the receding sun sent out his radiant beams, flashing outward and upward to the zenith and converging in fainter perspective in the east. Pilot Knob elevated his bold peak like a beacon pyramid on the plains of Egypt, and threw his dark shadow far off into the grand vista to the eastward, while Shepherd's Mountain, now with his visible side in the shade, reminded the young ladies of the fabled haunts of hobgoblins. They professed themselves well repaid for their journey by the sight of this glorious sunset, and concluded that "Arcadia Valley" was a delightful spot, and all it was reported

Then there came the pressing of ferns and other botanical trophies between book idaves, and the preparations for the walk back to Ironton for the night's lodging. Charlie was to remain in the tent; and as the party were to climb the Knob the next morning in time to see the sun rise, he promised to have breakfast ready by the time they came to the tent.

After supper at the hotel, the doctor and Captain Adams took a seat on the veranda outside, while Major Dabny spent the evening with the young ladies in the parlor. The major had really taken a strong liking to Miss Annie from their first meeting, and be appeared to be nowhere so happy as in har

While Dr. Chartervale and the captain were